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INTEREST ARBITRATION: THE ALTERNATIVE
TO THE STRIKEt
AR VID ANDERSON*
LORENA. KRAUSE"
INTRODUCTION
T tE right to bargain collectively has been so connected with the right
I strike in this country that legitimate questions arise as to whether
genuine collective bargaining can occur without the right to strike. The
thesis of this Article is that an alternative to the right to strike exists and
that that alternative is final and binding interest arbitration. This Article
will demonstrate the viability of interest arbitration as an alternative to
the strike by examining its implementation in the public sector.
Interest arbitration is a process in which the terms and conditions of
the employment contract are established by a final and binding decision
of the arbitration panel.' It differs from grievance arbitration, which in-
volves the interpretation of the employment contract to determine
whether the conditions of employment have been breached.2 Thus, inter-
est arbitration essentially is a legislative process, while grievance arbitra-
tion essentially is a judicial process. The following anecdote is a useful
starting point for understanding the significance of interest arbitration.
The Transport Workers Union ("TWU") of New York City used to
cry "no contract, no work."3 The TWU struck effectively in 1966 and
again in 1980, imposing great financial hardship on the city.' The 1980
strike resulted in the imposition of a $1,000,000 fine on the Union and
cost each worker two days' pay for each day of the eleven day strike.5
The strike hurt all of the parties involved, including the riding public.
t This Article is based on an Address delivered at the Pacific Coast Labor Law
Conference, Seattle, Washington, May 7, 1987. Portions of this Article will appear in
substantially similar form in a forthcoming treatise to be published by Matthew Bender &
Company Inc.
* President, National Academy of Arbitrators; Former Chairman, New York City
Office of Collective Bargaining (retired as of Jan. 1, 1988); B.A. 1946; L.L.B. 1948, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin.
** Trial Examiner, New York City Office of Collective Bargaining; B.S. 1977, Cor-
nell University, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations; J.D. 1983,
Yeshiva University-Cardozo School of Law.
1. See F. Elkouri & E.A. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 104 (4th ed. 1985). In-
terest arbitration, mediation and fact finding comprise the full panoply of procedures
available to resolve collective bargaining impasses.
2. See id. at 110-11 (Grievance arbitration is synonymous for what Elkouri and
Elkouri refer to as "rights arbitration").
3. See 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 521 (Apr. 8, 1985) ("Local 100, which
represents workers in the New York City bus and subway system, has never worked
without a contract since being organized in 1948.").
4. 858 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 26 (Apr. 21, 1980).
5. 862 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 34 (May 19, 1980).
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As a result of these experiences, the Metropolitan Transportation Au-
thority ("MTA") and the TWU jointly requested that the state legisla-
ture enact short-term legislation authorizing the state Public
Employment Relations Board ("PERB") to appoint an arbitration panel
to resolve any impasses that might arise in the 1982 contract negotia-
tions.6 The enacted legislation provided that PERB, upon the joint re-
quest of the MTA, the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating
Authority, and the Union representing their employees, would appoint a
panel consisting of the three impartial members of the New York City
Office of Collective Bargaining's Board of Collective Bargaining, with the
Chairman of the Board serving as the panel's Chairman.7 The Act fur-
ther provided that the determination of the panel would be final and
binding, except that any provision thereof that would require the enact-
ment of a law for its implementation would not be binding until such law
were enacted.8
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the panel commenced hearings
when the 1982 new contract negotiations reached an impasse-only three
days after the statute was enacted. 9 The dispute, therefore, was settled
without resorting to another burdensome strike. In 1985 the legislation
was renewed in anticipation of the next round of TWU contract negotia-
tions,' 0 but on that occasion the parties reached agreement and avoided
the need to invoke arbitration."
In 1986, the New York legislature amended the Taylor Law, 2 which
regulates labor disputes between state and local government employers
and employees, 13 to require that the MTA and the unions representing
its employees who are subject to the Taylor Law submit collective bar-
gaining impasses to final and binding arbitration. 4 The amendment ap-
plies to approximately 45,000 employees who operate subways and
6. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., Local
100, at 2 (PERB Apr. 29, 1982) (Anderson, Collins & Friedman, Arbs.) (available in the
files of the Fordham Law Review); Barbanel, Transit Arbitration Bill Signed by Carey,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1982, at B2, col. 4.
7. Act of Mar. 29, 1982, ch. 19, § 2(a), 1982 N.Y. Laws 28, 29.
8. Act of Mar. 29, 1982, ch. 19, § 2(g), 1982 N.Y. Laws 28, 30.
9. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Transit Workers Union of Am., Local 100
(PERB Apr. 29, 1982) (Anderson, Collins & Friedman, Arbs.) (available in the files of
the Fordham Law Review).
10. Act of Mar. 31, 1985, ch. 15, 1985 N.Y. Laws 18; see 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 521 (Apr. 8, 1985).
11. See 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 995 (July 15, 1985).
12. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988).
13. Id.
14. Act of Dec. 31, 1986, ch. 929, § 33.5(a), 1986 N.Y. Laws 2339, 2369-70. In mak-
ing the award, the law requires the arbitration panel to consider the impact of the award
on the MTA's financial condition and on commuter fares; the wages, benefits, and condi-
tions of other New York City employees; changes in the Consumer Price Index; and
other conditions. Id. at § 33.5(d). The law was modeled after provisions of the Taylor
Law that apply to police and firefighters-the only other public employees under PERB's
jurisdiction whose contract negotiations are subject to binding interest arbitration. See
N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209(5) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 56
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buses."5 This statutory interest arbitration provision alleviates the threat
of further crippling strikes by the TWU.
It is our view that either the right to strike or interest arbitration is
needed to make collective bargaining work. The success of collective
bargaining requires only one of these alternatives. The fact that the right
to strike is banned' 6 in all cases where interest arbitration is required by
statute 17 bears out this point. In those states that have adopted interest
arbitration, illegal strikes are virtually nonexistent.
15. Act of Dec. 31, 1986, ch. 929, § 33.5(a), 1986 N.Y. Laws 2339, 2369-70.
16. All states that mandate interest arbitration ban the strike for those employees
covered by the statute. Alaska - Alaska Stat. § 23.40.200(b) (1984). Connecticut -
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 5-279, 7-475, 10-153e(a) (1983). District ofColumbia - D.C. Code
Ann. § 1-618.5 (1987). Hawaii - Haw. Rev. Stat. § 89-12 (1985). Illinois - 111. Ann.
Stat. ch. 48, para. 1614 (Smith-Hurd 1986). Iowa - Iowa Code Ann. § 20.12 (West
1978). Maine - Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, §§ 979-C.2.C, 1027.2.C, 1284.2.C (1964 &
Supp. 1987). Michigan - Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.202 (West 1978). Minnesota
- Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179A.19 (West Supp. 1988). Montana - Mont. Code Ann. § 39-
34-105 (1987). Nevada - Nev. Rev. Stat. § 288.230 (1985). New Jersey - NJ. Stat.
Ann. § 34:13A-14 (West Supp. 1987). New York - N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 210 (MeKin-
ney 1983 & Supp. 1988); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-312(e) (1986). Ohio - Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4117.15 (Anderson Supp. 1986). Oregon - Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.726(1)
(1985). Pennsylvania - Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 215.2 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1987).
Rhode Island - R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-11-6 (1984); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-9.1-2, 28-9.2-2,
28-9.5-2 (1986). Vermont - Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1730(2) (1978). Washington -
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 41.56.490 (Supp. 1987). Wisconsin - Wisc. Stat. Ann.
§§ 111.70(4)(), 111.77 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987).
17. The following states have adopted interest arbitration procedures for the indi-
cated employees: Alaska - Alaska Stat. § 23.40.200(b) (1984) (police, firefighters, jail,
prison and other correctional institution employees, hospital employees). Connecticut -
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-276(a), 7-473c, 10-153f(c)(4) (West Supp. 1988) (state em-
ployees, municipal employees, and teachers, respectively). District of Columbia - D.C.
Code Ann. § 1-618.2(d) (1987) (all public employees). Hawaii - Haw. Rev. Stat. § 89-
11 (1985) (all public employees). Illinois - Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, para. 1614 (Smith-
Hurd 1986) (security employees, peace officers, firefighters and paramedics). Iowa -
Iowa Code Ann. § 20.22 (West 1978) (all public employees). Maine - Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 26, § 979-D.4 (1964) (state employees); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, §§ 1026.4
(Supp. 1987) (university employees); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 1285.4 (Supp. 1987)
(judicial employees). Michigan - Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 423.273 (West Supp.
1987) (state police troopers and sergeants); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 423.233 (West
1978) (municipal police and firefighters). Minnesota - Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179A.16
(West Supp. 1988) (all public employees). Montana - Mont. Code Ann. § 39-34-101
(1987) (firefighters). Nevada - Nev. Rev. Stat. § 288.215 (1985) (firefighters). New
Jersey - N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-16 (,Vest Supp. 1987) (police and firefighters). New
York - N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988) (police, firefighters
and transit workers); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-31 l(c)(3)(b) (1986) (all public employ-
ees). Ohio - Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4117.14D (Anderson Supp. 1986) (police, firefight-
ers, highway patrol, emergency medical personnel, employees of state schools for deaf
and blind, corrections officers and guards). Oregon - Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.742 (1985) (all
public employees). Pennsylvania - Penn. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 217.4, 1101.805 (Purdon
Supp. 1987) (prison and mental hospital guards, court employees, police and firefighters).
Rhode Island - R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-11-9 (1984) (state employees); R.I. Gen. Laws
§§ 28-9.5-1 to 28-9.5-16, 28-9.2-1 to 28-9.2-16, 28-9.1-1 to 28-9.1-17 (1986) (state police,
municipal police, and municipal firefighters respectively). Vermont - Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
21, § 1733 (1978 & Supp. 1986) (municipal employees). Washington - Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 41.56.450, 41.56.950 (Supp. 1987) (uniform personnel). Wisconsin - Wisc. Stat.
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Undeniably, in some cases the strike weapon can be extremely effective
in obtaining bargaining rights for employees as well as in achieving con-
tract gains. Unfortunately, however, a strike can result in the self-immo-
lation of those employees without the power to strike effectively."8
Moreover, even states that have sanctioned the right to strike for some
public employees have not done so for police, firefighters and other cate-
gories of employees who have the power to threaten seriously the health
and safety of the community if they strike. 9 We submit that interest
arbitration enables all employees to achieve favorable employment con-
tract terms20 by offering an alternative to the strike that similarly stimu-
lates bargaining.
Ann. §§ 111.70(4)(jm), 111.77(4) (West 1974 & Supp. 1987) (city police, firefighters, and
county police respectively). Wyoming - Wyo. Stat. § 27-10-105 (1987) (firefighters).
18. The experience of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO)
provides a vivid reminder of the ineffectiveness of the strike weapon. See generally Melt-
zer & Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic Con-
trollers, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 731 (1983); 924 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 5, 12, 45 (Aug.
10, 1981); 923 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 6 (Aug. 3, 1981). On August 3, 1981,
PATCO went on strike in an attempt to gain new contract concessions from the govern-
ment. See 923 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 6 (Aug. 3, 1981). The Federal Aviation
Administration discharged all of the approximately 12,000 air traffic controllers who par-
ticipated in the strike. See 924 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 5 (Aug. 10, 1981). The
strike violated the federal labor-management relations provisions of the Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1978 which prohibits strikes by federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 7311
(1982).
19. Several states grant some or all of their public employees who are not required to
submit their impasses to interest arbitration, but who may opt to, a limited right to strike.
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 23.40.(c)-(d) (1986); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 89-12 (1985); 111. Ann.
Stat. ch. 48, para. 1617 (Smith-Hurd 1984); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179A.18 (West Supp.
1988); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1986); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 243.726 (1985); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1987); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21, § 1730 (1978).
Where the statute is silent as to the right to strike, it is unclear whether or not the right
exists at all. Compare, e.g., County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Em-
ployees Ass'n, Local 660, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 586-92, 699 P.2d 835, 850-54, 214 Cal. Rptr.
424, 439-43 (in the absence of a statute prohibiting strikes by public employees, such as in
the case of police and firefighters, legislative grant of the right to organize and engage in
concerted activities impliedly conferred the right to strike but empowered the courts to
enjoin strikes that threatened community safety and health), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 408
(1985) with, e.g., Compton Unified School Dist. v. Compton Educ. Ass'n, Case No. LA-
CO-396, PERB Order No. 1R-50 (Calif. Mar. 17, 1987) (available in the files of the
Fordham Law Review) (California Public Employment Relations Board reversed earlier
decision and ruled a series of strikes by Compton Education Association illegal under
State's Educational Employment Relations Act because law does not explicitly or implic-
itly grant teachers right to strike). For a general discussion of the public employee's right
to strike, see G. Sterrett & A. Aboud, The Right to Strike in Public Employment (New
York State School of Industrial & Labor Relations Key Issues Series No. 15, 1982).
20. For example, New York police and firefighters have achieved arbitrated salary
increases that compare favorably with negotiated increases. See infra notes 158-63 and
accompanying text. But see Feuille, Delaney & Hendricks, The Impact of Interest Arbi-
tration on Police Contracts, 24 Ind. Rel. 161 (1985) (study suggests that although availa-
bility of interest arbitration is related to favorable police contracts, there is "almost no
support for the belief that actually using arbitration will yield better contracts for the
unions").
INTEREST ARBITRATION
This Article demonstrates the effectiveness of interest arbitration as an
alternative to the strike. Part I discusses the various types of interest
arbitration procedures adopted by states and the statutory standards that
guide arbitrators in reaching decisions. Drawing on our experience as
arbitrators, we then propose guidelines for an effective presentation to an
interest arbitration panel. Part II examines judicial treatment of interest
arbitration awards and statutes, including the general failure of constitu-
tional challenges to the statutes and the limited judicial review of interest
arbitration awards. Finally, New York City's experience with interest
arbitration, discussed in Part III, clinches our view favoring interest
arbitration.
I. INTEREST ARBITRATION DEFINED
A. Types of Interest Arbitration Procedures: State Laws
At least twenty states have enacted laws providing for interest arbitra-
tion to resolve disputes over the terms of new collective bargaining agree-
ments with their public employees.2 Most of the statutes apply to
essential service employees, particularly police and firefighters, but some
are more general.22 The type of interest arbitration procedure adopted,
however, varies from state to state.
Some state statutes provide for conventional arbitration, which gives
the arbitrator the discretion to decide the issues in dispute based upon
the parties' evidence and arguments as measured against the relevant
statutory criteria.23 Other state statutes utilize final offer arbitration,
which requires that the arbitrator pick either the employer's or the em-
ployee organization's final offer on the issues in dispute.24 In some in-
stances the statutes include provisions that permit the parties to agree
voluntarily on the type of interest arbitration procedure to be used.25
Some statutes adopt a combination of conventional arbitration and fi-
nal offer arbitration, treating economic and non-economic issues differ-
ently. Michigan's police and firefighters statute, for example, provides
for final offer arbitration on an issue-by-issue basis on economic issues
and for conventional arbitration on non-economic issues.26 Wisconsin's
municipal arbitration law adopts a variation that allows the arbitrator to
choose between the total package, both economic and non-economic, of
21. See supra note 17.
22. Id
23. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 979-D.4 (1964); N.J. Stat. Ann. 34:13A-16.C
(West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988); N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 12-311(c)(3) (1986); Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.756 (1985).
24. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-276a(e)(3) (West Supp. 1988); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 423.238, 423.239 (West 1978); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-16(c)(2) (West
Supp. 1987); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 111.77 (West 1974 & Supp. 1987).
25. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-311(f) (1986).
26. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.238 (West 1978).
1987]
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the employer's or union's final offer.2 7 New Jersey's law embodies yet
another variation, requiring the arbitrator to choose either the em-
ployer's or the union's last offer as a total economic package, but al-
lowing the arbitrator to resolve non-economic issues on a final offer,
issue-by-issue basis.28 Finally, Iowa provides for final offer determina-
tion of both economic and non-economic issues on an issue-by-issue ba-
sis.29 Utilizing a unique tri-option procedure the Iowa framework
permits the arbitrator to select either the employer's last offer, the
union's last offer, or the fact finder's recommendations on each issue.30
Observers credit this procedure with encouraging voluntary settle-
ments. 3' As a result, Iowa has reported a comparatively low percentage
of collective bargaining negotiations requiring use of its interest arbitra-
tion procedures.32
Each of the above noted procedures has strengths and weaknesses.
Only one state, however, that has adopted a particular type of interest
arbitration procedure has subsequently altered its approach.3 3 This
seems to indicate that parties have accommodated to the available
scheme of interest arbitration. Our preference is for conventional arbi-
tration,34 because it gives the arbitrator the greatest latitude in deciding
the issues in dispute.
B. Statutory Standards
Virtually all interest arbitration statutes either expressly or implicitly
provide standards to guide the arbitrator's evaluation of the evidence and
arguments presented.35 They do so by requiring the arbitrator to focus
27. Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 111.77(4) (West Supp. 1987).
28. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-16(d)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
29. Iowa Code Ann. § 20.22(1 1) (West 1978).
30. Id.
31. R. A. Lester, Labor Arbitration in State and Local Government 171 (1984).
32. Id. at 156.
33. The exception is Wisconsin, which has deleted the mediation-arbitration feature
from its municipal employees law. Compare Wisc. Stat. Ann., § 111.70(4)(c) (West 1974)
with Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 11 1.70(4)(cm) (West Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the media-
tion-arbitration feature, see R. A. Lester, supra note 31, at 75-78.
34. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
35. The following jurisdictions have enacted interest arbitration statutes that require
the arbitrator to consider the indicated statutory standards in his determination of the
matters in dispute: Connecticut - Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-276a(e)(5) (West Supp.
1987) (history of negotiations between the parties; conditions of similar groups of em-
ployees; prevailing wages; and the employer's ability to pay); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-
473c, 10-153f(c)(4) (West 1986 & Supp. 1987) (prior negotiations between the parties;
public interest and financial capability of the municipal employer; interest and welfare of
employee group; changes in the cost of living; conditions of employment of employee
group and similar groups; the salaries, fringe benefits; and other conditions of employ-
ment in the state labor market). District of Columbia - D.C. Code Ann. § 1-618.2(d)
(1987) (all relevant laws, rules and regulations; the District's ability to comply; the public
health, safety and welfare; and the need for reasonable and consistent personnel policies).
Hawaii - Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 89-1 l(d) (1985) (lawful authority of the employer; stipula-
tions of the parties; public welfare; fiscal condition of the state, county and employer;
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on particular facts in reaching his decision. Statutory standards that ar-
bitrators must address usually include "[t]he lawful authority of the em-
ployer," "[t]he interests and welfare of the public," the comparability of
prevailing wages of similar groups of employees; cost of living; and employee's current
compensation package). Illinois - Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 28, para. 1614(h) (Smith-Hurd
1984) (lawful authority of the employer; stipulations of the parties; interest and welfare of
the public; financial ability of the employer; cost of living; conditions of employment of
comparable employees in the public and private sectors; and current overall compensa-
tion). Iowa - Iowa Code Ann. 20.22(9) (West 1978) (past collective bargaining con-
tracts between the parties; prevailing compensation of comparable employees; interest
and welfare of the public; employer's ability to pay). Maine - Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
26, §§ 97-9D.4.C, 1026(4)(C), 1285(4)(B) (1964 & Supp. 1987) (interest and welfare of
the public; the financial ability of the government; working conditions of other employees
in the same labor market; overall compensation employees presently receive and other
factors normally taken into account). Michigan - Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 423.29,
423.280 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987) (lawful authority of employer;, stipulations of the
parties; interest and welfare of the public; employer's ability to pay; comparison of similar
groups of both public and private employees; and cost of living and current compensation
of the employees). Minnesota - Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179A.16(7) (West Supp. 1988)
("statutory rights and obligations of public employers to manage efficiently and conduct
their operations within the legal limitations surrounding the financing of these opera-
tions"). Montana - Mont. Code Ann. § 39-34-103(5) (1987) (compensation and work-
ing conditions of employees performing similar services; interest and welfare of the
public; employer's ability to pay; cost of living; and any other relevant circumstances).
Nevada - Nev. Rev. Stat. § 288.200(7)(b) (1985) (financial ability of the local govern-
ment and "normal criteria for interest disputes"). New Jersey - NJ. Stat. Ann.
§ 34:13A-16(g) (West Supp. 1987) (interest and welfare of the public; conditions of em-
ployees performing similar services; current compensation of the employees; stipulations
of the parties; lawful authority of the employer; financial impact on the employer; and
cost of living). New York - N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209.4(c)(v), 209.5(d) (McKinney
1983 & Supp. 1988) (wages and conditions of public employees performing similar work;
current compensation of the employees; cost of living;, and the interest and welfare of the
public); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-31 lc.(3)(b)(i)-(v) (1986) (wages and conditions of em-
ployment of public and private employees performing similar work; current compensa-
tion of employees; cost of living; interest and welfare of the public; and other factors
normally taken into consideration). Ohio - Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4117.14(G)(7) (An-
derson Supp. 1986) (past agreements between the parties; conditions of other public and
private employees doing comparable work; interest and welfare of the public; financial
ability of the employer; authority of the public employer; stipulations of the parties; and
other factors normally taken into consideration). Oregon - Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.746(4)
(1985) (employer's lawful authority; stipulations of the parties; public welfare; employer's
ability to pay; comparison of wages of public and private employees providing similar
service; cost of living; present compensation; and other normal considerations). Rhode
Island - R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-9.1-10, 28-9.2-10 (1986) (wages and working conditions
of employees performing similar services; interest and welfare of the public; peculiarities
of the job; and employer's ability to pay); R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-11-10 (1984) (same). Ver-
mont - Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 1732(d), 1733(c) (1978) (authority of the employer,
stipulations of the parties; interest and welfare of the public; financial ability of the mu-
nicipal employer; conditions of employees performing similar work; cost of living; and
overall compensation presently received by the employees). Washington - Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 41.56.460 (Supp. 1987) (employer's authority; stipulations of the parties;
comparison of wages of employees providing similar services; cost of living; and other
traditional factors). Wisconsin - Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 111.7(6) (West 1974) (employer's
lawful authority and ability to meet costs; stipulations of the parties; public welfare com-
parison of wages of public and private employees providing similar services; cost of living;
overall present compensation; and other traditional factors).
1987]
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the wages, hours and working conditions of similarly situated employees,
and the cost of living.36 In addition, arbitrators may be required to con-
sider the peculiarities of a particular trade or profession, 37 past agree-
ments of the parties,38 the ability of the employer to finance economic
adjustments, 39 and the effect of an award on the standard of services
provided.4°
The type of interest arbitration procedure mandated by the statute, or
agreed to by the parties, will have an impact on the arbitrator's applica-
tion of the statutory criteria and the rationale for his decisions. When,
for example, the statute requires arbitrators to use final offer arbitra-
tion,4" arbitrators exercise much more limited discretion than they do
when the statute or agreement provides for conventional arbitration of
both economic and non-economic issues. Indeed, in a final offer, total
package scheme,42 the arbitrators must choose one or the other offer re-
36. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.239(a) to (h) (West 1978). The statutory
criteria listed in the Michigan statute comprise perhaps the most comprehensive list of
the statutory standards. They are as follows:
(a) The lawful authority of the employer.
(b) Stipulations of the parties.
(c) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the
unit of government to meet those costs.
(d) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the
employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and
conditions of employment of other employees performing similar services and
with other employees generally:
(i) In public employment in comparable communities.
(ii) In private employment in comparable communities.
(e) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known
as the cost of living.
(f) The overall compensation presently received by the employees, includ-
ing direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other excused time, in-
surance and pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and
stability of employment, and all other benefits received.
(g) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of
the arbitration proceedings.
(h) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or
traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and
conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation,
fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service
or in private employment.
Id.
37. New York's Taylor Law, for example, requires the arbitration panel to consider:
(1) hazards of employment;
(2) physical qualifications;
(3) educational qualifications;
(4) mental qualifications; and
(5) job training and skills.
N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209.4(c)(v)c (McKinney 1983).
38. Iowa Code Ann. § 20.22(9)a (West 1978).
39. Id. at § 20.22(9)c.
40. Id. at § 20.22(9)b.
41. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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gardless of their views on the merits of individual economic and non-
economic issues.
The most significant statutory standard for arbitration in the public
sector is comparability. Because the profit motive is absent in the public
sector, and therefore the full range of market forces generally governing
the value of jobs is lacking, comparability provides an acceptable substi-
tute measure of job worth. Comparability establishes the market value of
public sector labor by analyzing, among other things, the effects of infla-
tion and cost of living increases on compensation of comparable employ-
ees.4 3 The arbitrators therefore must answer the question of with which
employers and employees the comparison should be made.
Typically, the statute requires a comparison of the overall compensa-
tion of the employees involved in the dispute with the overall compensa-
tion of comparable employees performing similar work in both private
and public employment in a particular community or like communities."
The overall compensation of employees includes not only the basic wages
and benefits, but overtime and premium pay, health insurance, life insur-
ance, pension programs and other benefits, such as food, clothing and
transportation allowances.45 But what constitutes "like work" and what
is a "comparable employee?" Exact public sector and private sector par-
allels often exist. For example, a comparison of the compensation of pri-
vate hospital employees with their public counterparts seems
appropriate. The same is true of many other occupations. But, the com-
parison fails when applied to, for example, police and firefighters with
private employees.4 6
The general term "interest and welfare of the public," included in a
number of state laws, is subject to different interpretations because it is
not self-defining. In New York City, for example, the term "interest and
welfare of the public" requires consideration of the employer's "ability to
pay,"' 4 7 a separate criterion in most statutes.48 The same phrase also has
43. See Fox, Criteria for Public Sector Interest Arbitration in New York City: The
Triumph of Ability to Pay and the End of Interest Arbitration, 46 Alb. L. Rev. 97, 101-02
(1981).
44. New York's Taylor Law, for example, directs the arbitrator to consider the fol-
lowing criteria: "comparison of... the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of
other employees performing similar services or requiring similar skills under similar
working conditions and with other employees generally in public and private employment
in comparable communities." N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209.4(c)(v)a (McKinney 1983).
45. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-31 lb(3)(b)(ii) (1986).
46. One arbitration panel capsuled the problem of ambiguity by stating:
"[c]omparability, like beauty, quite obviously, is in the eye of the beholder." United
States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, at 21 (Dec. 24. 1984) (Kerr,
Simon, Kheel, Nash and Mahon, Arbs.) (available in the files of the Fordham Law
Review).
47. See Fox, supra note 43, at 114. On September 15, 1976, the City Council Com-
mittee on Civil Service and Labor turned down a proposal to amend the New York City
Collective Bargaining Law to add the ability to pay criterion on the ground that such
action would be superfluous. See, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1976, at 24, col. 2. Nonetheless,
a 1978 amendment to the Financial Emergency Act, in effect through 1986, expressly
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been used in New York City to refer to bargaining patterns-the practice
whereby once an agreement has been entered into by the employer and a
union, the standards of the first agreement will affect the contracts of all
other similarly situated unions.49
Bargaining patterns assume particular importance in the public sector,
where the employer is required to bargain with a number of different
labor organizations. The economic settlements for uniformed employees,
for example, influence settlements for non-uniformed employees and vice
versa. The wages paid by the state also may be relevant in determining
the wages that should be paid by a county or a city for persons perform-
ing similar work, such as law enforcement or clerical duties. In addition,
historic parity relationships may exist, particularly among uniformed
forces, police officers and firefighters.5° Such patterns are considered
under the general standard of interest and welfare of the public.
The criterion of the interest and welfare of the public determines, in
part, the priority to be given to the wages and economic benefits of public
sector employees. Obviously, the decision to increase wages and improve
economic benefits will affect the overall allocation of the employer's re-
sources. Should more money be spent to raise the salaries of the existing
workforce, to increase the number of workers, or for captial improve-
ments and increased services? One commentator has suggested that arbi-
trators should be prepared to justify their choice of priorities," and some
statutes require arbitrators to set forth the specific bases for their
decisions.52
The employer's ability to pay constitutes another major factor in col-
lective bargaining negotiations and interest arbitration.53 Indeed, the
required the Board to consider the employer's ability to pay. See N.Y. Unconsol. Laws
§ 5408.3 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1988).
48. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
49. For example, in United Federation of Teachers, Local 2 v. Board of Educucation,
Case No. IA-1-85 (OCB Sept. 16, 1985) (Garrett, Gill and Schienman, Arb.) (available in
the files of the Fordham Law Review) the arbitration panel stated:
Each labor organization and each negotiation has its own issues and problems
which need to be addressed. Often these concerns may require deviating from
the general pattern. On the other hand, we are persuaded that the relationship
or linkage between the major municipal unions is an important factor which
cannot be ignored or minimized. The Union has long been compared to and
has in fact been a participant in the municipal coalition. This relationship
surely represents one of the important factors "normally and customarily con-
sidered in the determination of wages, hours, fringe benefits . . ." and is an
important component in considering the "interest and welfare of the public."
Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
50. See generally C. R. Morris, The Cost of Good Intentions 97-106, 120-24 (1980)
(discussing the historical interrelationship of economic and non-economic contract gains
among police, firefighters and uniformed forces in New York City).
51. See Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 815,
832 (1984).
52. See infra notes 69-93 and accompanying text.
53. See generally Fox, supra note 43, at 102-04 (ability to pay criterion analyzes the
effects of inflation and cost of living increases on the employer's ability to meet compensa-
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economic circumstances of a given jurisdiction may make it the decisive
factor in negotiations or in arbitration. 4
Factors other than the size of the municipal fisc, however, often im-
pact the ability to pay. Iowa's statute, for example, limits the authority
of an arbitration panel by imposing budgetary constraints that narrow
the scope of the employer's ability to pay. 55 In some juridictions, such as
New York City, the statute imposes a general limitation on the authority
of arbitration panels by providing that any part of an award that requires
the enactment of a law in order to implement the award cannot be imple-
mented until such law is enacted. 6 Finally, the question of ability to pay
becomes particularly complex when the funding of a specific service,
such as welfare, health care or education, requires substantial funding
from various levels of government-local, state and federal."
In addition to explicit statutory standards, a number of jurisdictions
use a catch-all standard that refers to "[s]uch other factors ... which are
normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of
wages, hours and conditions of employment.""S A provision like this en-
ables the arbitrator to choose those criteria that he deems most impor-
tant in a particular case as long as he discusses the other statutory factors
that were also considered in the opinion.
In considering and applying any of the listed criteria of a particular
state, the arbitrator must consider whether the issues submitted to him
for decision fall within the employer's lawful scope of bargaining." The
scope of bargaining generally encompasses wages, hours, and working
conditions, but the laws of a particular jurisdiction may require a more
limited scope of bargaining once interest arbitration proceedings com-
mence. In Maine and Rhode Island, for example, the award is merely
advisory on economic matters, while it is final and binding on non-eco-
tion gains). The ability to pay criterion also analyzes the competing needs for increased
services and capital improvements versus the need for reasonable and responsible com-
pensation of employees.
54. During the New York City fiscal crisis, ability to pay was statutorily defined as
whether or not the requested wage increase could be paid without increasing the level of
city taxes over and above that which prevailed when the dispute arose. N.Y. Unconsol.
Laws, § 5408.3(h) (McKinney 1979). This definition, which the parties and arbitrators
were required to consider during the fiscal crisis, had an inhibiting effect on the size of the
municipal unions' wage demands. See generally Fox, supra note 43, at 120-25.
55. See Iowa Code Ann. §§ 20.22(13), 20.17(6) (West 1978).
56. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-31 lc(3)(e) (1986).
57. For example, in the most recent round of negotiations between the United Feder-
ation of Teachers, Local 2 and the New York City Board of Education, the employer was
able to grant teachers a significant increase in wages because of money available from the
state under its Excellence in Teaching program. The New York City Board of Educa-
tion's share of the state money was S31 million in the first year and $42 million in the
second year of the three year contract. See 25 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1285 (Sept.
14, 1987).
58. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.239(h) (West 1978).
59. See generally 2 B. Werne, The Law and Practice of Public Employment Labor
Relations § 15.2 (1974).
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nomic matters.6° Consideration of pensions as a subject for collective
bargaining is forbidden in some states and, consequently, may not be sub-
jected to interest arbitration. 6' In addition, the determinations of appli-
cable public employment relations boards and courts may establish other
limitations on the scope of bargaining.62
Last, the stipulations of the parties as to the scope of the arbitration
and the standards to be applied in a particular case must be considered
by the arbitrator and may affect the outcome of the arbitration. For ex-
ample, in 1985, the New York City Board of Education, the City of New
York, and the United Federation of Teachers entered into a voluntary
agreement providing for total package, last offer binding arbitration of a
contract dispute involving New York City teachers.63 The parties in-
cluded in their agreement the statutory standards applicable to other
New York City employees.64
C. Presentation of Interest Arbitration Cases
Traditional trial procedures are less than efficient in an interest arbitra-
tion proceeding because, unlike a trial, interest arbitration is essentially a
legislative process. Based on our experience as interest arbitrators and as
administrators of an interest arbitration statute, we propose the following
guidelines for successful presentation before an interest arbitration panel.
It is our view that the most satisfactory procedure for presenting an
interest arbitration case is to address the issue or issues initially by pre-
hearing statements of position. The submission of pre-hearing state-
ments enables the arbitrator to focus clearly on the positions of the par-
ties and on the questions to be decided. This method also permits
consideration of complex issues in a relatively short period of time.65
60. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26 § 965(4) (1964 & Supp. 1987); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 36-11-9 (1984).
61. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 201.4 (McKinney 1983).
62. For example, the New York City Collective Bargaining Law provides: "The re-
port of an impasse panel shall be confined to matters within the scope of collective bar-
gaining. Unless the mayor agrees otherwise, an impasse panel shall make no report
concerning the basic salary and increment structure and pay plan rules of the city's career
and salary plan." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-311 c(3)(c) (1986).
63. See United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2 v. Board of Educ., Case No. IA-1-85 at 2
(OCB Sept. 16, 1985) (Garrett, Gill and Schienman, Arbs.) (available in the files of the
Fordham Law Review); see also, NYC Teachers Get Three-Year Pact Through Binding
Arbitration, 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1358 (Sept. 23, 1985).
64. See United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2 v. Board of Educ., Case No. IA-1-85 at 9
(OCB Sept. 16, 1985) (Garrett, Gill and Schienman, Arbs.) (available in the files of the
Fordham Law Review).
65. The 1982 New York City Transit case, the Postal Arbitration of 1984 and the
New York City Board of Education/United Federation of Teachers Arbitration of 1985
demonstrate that complex issues can be presented and resolved in a compressed time
period when pre-hearing statements are used. See New York City Transit Auth. v.
Transit Workers Union of Am., Local 100, at 3 (N.Y. PERB Apr. 29, 1982) (Anderson,
Collins and Friedman, Arbs.) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review); United
States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, at 4 (FMCS Dec. 24, 1984)
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The parties should use narration rather than the question and answer
method of presentation at the hearing. The interest arbitration process is
also facilitated by using the principal witnesses to explain the parties'
proposals and contract demands and eliminating cross-examination ex-
cept for the limited purpose of clarification. The parties are thus able to
create a clear record of their positions in a relatively short period of
time.66 The parties can then rely on rebuttal to refute or to answer the
opposing side's position.6 7 The parties should also agree in advance how
they will allot the time available for the presentation of their respective
cases and the time available for rebuttal.68
In making their presentation, the parties need not be overly concerned
about rules of evidence. Some attorneys excel in their ability to conduct
voir dire and in the making of objections to the admission of documents
based upon either the best evidence rule or the manner in which a docu-
ment was prepared. Such objections can be significant, but they are not
nearly as important as arguing or explaining the relevance, or lack
thereof, of a particular document submitted in support of a party's
position.
II. INTEREST ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS
A. Judicial Review of Interest Arbitration Awards
The inclusion of statutory standards in interest arbitration statutes
provides the arbitration panel with guidelines for fashioning its award.
To facilitate judicial review of interest arbitration awards, some statutes
explicitly require that the arbitration panel specify the basis for its
award. 69 Moreover, some courts have held that it is not enough for the
arbitration panel to state that it considered the statutory standards.
(Kerr, Kheel, Simon, Mahon and Nash, Arbs.) (available in the files of the Fordham Law
Review); United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2 v. Board of Educ., Case No. IA-1-85 at 3-4
(OCB Sept. 16, 1985) (Garrett, Gill and Scheinman, Arbs.) (available in the files of the
Fordham Law Review); see also, NYC Teachers Get Three- Year Pact Through Binding
Arbitration, 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1358 (Sept. 23, 1985); Arbitrators Settle
Postal Impasse with Three Annual Pay Hikes, 22 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2329
(Dec. 31, 1984).
66. These procedures enabled presentation of ten witnesses' testimony in four days in
the UFT arbitration, United Fed'n of Teachers, at 4-5, and sixteen witnesses' testimony in
five days in the transit workers arbitration. New York City Transit Auth., at 3. The
postal arbitration produced "over 2,000 pages of expert testimony.... just under 300
exhibits and over 4,000 pages of documentation" in only seven days of public hearings.
United States Postal Service, at 16.
67. For example, in the UFT arbitration one day was allotted for rebuttal. United
Fed'n of Teachers, at 5.
68. The arbitration panel typically will determine the duration of the arbitration after
meeting with the parties at a pre-hearing conference. The parties must then divide the
time amongst themselves. It has been our experience that the parties usually will con-
struct a plan themselves rather than be subject to a plan set by the panel.
69. See, eg., N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209.4(c)(v) (McKinney 1983) ("panel shall spec-
ify the basis for its findings"); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-276a(e)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1988)
("arbitrator... shall state with particularity the basis for such decision as to each dis-
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Rather, the arbitration panel must make detailed findings of fact that
support its conclusions. 70 Because the New York courts have had an
opportunity to construe interest arbitration statutes and awards, New
York caselaw is the focal point of the following discussion of such judi-
cial treatment.
The grounds for vacating interest arbitration awards in New York
state are broader than the grounds for vacating grievance arbitration
awards. A party to a grievance arbitration can successfully challenge an
award if the award was procured by fraud or undue means, if there was a
lack of due process, or if the award was in excess of the authority of the
arbitration panel.7" In contrast, interest arbitration awards can be va-
cated if the award is not based on objective and impartial consideration
of the entire record, if the statutory criteria were not considered in good
faith, or if there is no plausible basis for the award.72
When the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with the need
to formulate a standard of review for interest arbitration awards, it
sought guidance from the standard used for grievance arbitration
awards. A reviewing court will not vacate a grievance arbitration award
even if there has been a patent error of fact or law.73 Similarly, the stan-
dard for interest arbitration review, first enunciated by the Court of Ap-
peals in Caso v. Coffey, 4 measures interest arbitration awards "according
to whether they are rational or arbitrary and capricious."75
At the New York City level, the Board of Collective Bargaining
puted issue and the manner in which the factors enumerated . . . were considered in
arriving at such decision").
70. See, e.g., Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Buffalo, 82 A.D.2d 635, 638,
443 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (1981) (arbitration panel must set forth with specificity the com-
parisons used in reaching their decision); Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408
Mich. 410, 482, 294 N.W.2d 68, 96 (1980) (arbitration panel must consider only the
applicable statutory standards and its opinion must disclose the reasons for considering
the various standards and explain its result).
71. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 7511 (McKinney 1980) provides:
(b) Grounds for vacating.
1. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either par-
ticipated in the arbitration or was served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if
the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(i) corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where the
award was by confession; or
(iii) an arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded his
power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made; or
(iv) failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the party ap-
plying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of the
defect and without objection.
72. See Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 158, 359 N.E.2d 683, 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88,
91 (1976).
73. See Temporary Comm'n of Investigation v. French, 68 A.D.2d 681, 690, 418
N.Y.S.2d 774, 779 (1979).
74. 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976).
75. Id. at 158, 359 N.E.2d at 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
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adopted standards of review for impasse panel determinations compara-
ble to those applied by the courts in reviewing an administrative agency
decision under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.76 Courts
have the statutory authority to review administrative agency decisions
essentially for abuses of discretion and lack of substantial evidence.77
Similarly, the Board's policy is to defer to the impasse panel's determina-
tion unless the appellant can show that the arbitration was unfair or bi-
ased, or that the determination is patently lacking in factual support.""
Although the substantial evidence test applied to impasse panel reports
under the New York City Collective Bargaining Law differs from the
standard of review adopted in Coffey, experience with the two standards
of review reveals very little substantive difference between them. Both
the courts and the Board of Collective Bargaining focus on procedural
fairness and the existence of record evidence to support the conclusions
of the interest arbitration panel. Neither reviewing forum will substitute
its judgment for that of the panel if it appears that the panel considered
the statutory criteria.
To facilitate review, New York amended its Taylor Law in 1977 to
require that "the public arbitration panel shall.., specify the basis for its
findings, taking into consideration, in addition to any other relevant fac-
tors, the [enumerated statutory standards]."79 Prior to this amendment,
the statute required only that the arbitration panel consider the statutory
standards "so far as it deem[ed] them applicable."" ° The amendment
came in response to criticism that this was an overly broad delegation of
municipal authority to the arbitration panels."1 The state legislature in-
tended the newly required specificity and thoroughness to facilitate strin-
76. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 7803 (McKinney 1981) provides that an article 78 pro-
ceeding may determine only whether there has been a failure to perform a legal duty, the
official body is acting or is prepared to act beyond its jurisdiction, a decision is the result
of procedural violations or an abuse of discretion, or a decision reached after a legally
prescribed hearing is supported by substantial evidence.
77. IkL
78. See City of New York v. Podiatry Soc'y, No. BCB 1-1-72, Decision No. B-23-72,
slip. op. at 8-9 (Board of Collective Bargaining Dec. 11, 1972) (available in the files of the
Fordham Law Review). The Board has stated its policy as follows:
If the impasse panel has afforded the parties full and fair opportunity to submit
testimony and evidence relevant to the matter in controversy; unless it can be
shown that the Report and Recommendations were not based upon objective
and impartial consideration of the entire record; and unless clear evidence is
presented on appeal either that the proceedings have been tainted by fraud or
bias or that the Report and Recommendations are patently inconsistent with
the evidence or that on its face it is flawed by material and essential errors of
fact and/or law, the Report and the Recommendations must be upheld.
Id.
79. Act of June 7, 1977, ch. 216, § 4(c)(v), 1977 N.Y. Laws 276, 280. See infra notes
117-120 & 144-149 and accompanying text for discussion of the Taylor Law.
80. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 725, § 4(c)(v), 1974 N.Y. Laws 1125, 1127.
81. See Gov. Memorandum, reprinted in 1977 N.Y. Laws 2489-90.
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gent judicial review of interest arbitration awards.8 2
Three New York State Supreme Court decisions, which have set aside
or remanded awards because of their failure to specify the basis of their
decision, have given meaning to the 1977 amendment.8 3 In Buffalo Po-
lice Benevolent Association v. City of Buffalo, 4 the court held that a state-
ment in the award that " 'all economic issues were considered' fails to
meet the explicit statutory requirement of a specific basis for findings."8"
The court in City of Yonkers v. Mutual Aid Association of Paid Fire De-
partment,86 explained that factual specificity with regard to two of the
four factors listed in the amended section was inadequate.8 7 Most re-
cently, in City of Batavia v. Local 896, Batavia Firefighters Association,"8
the court opined that "boiler plate statutory language recited in the back-
ground portion of the award alone fails to meet the explicit statutory
requirement for a specific basis for the findings."8 9 It added that the
"arbitration panel has some obligation to explore each criterion, not sim-
ply as an arbiter, but also as a quasi-legislative body delegated with a
similar factfinding mission, and that the results of that analysis must be
clearly and completely specified in its award."9 Furthermore, the court
held that "to the extent the criterion are not controverted, i.e., 'put in
issue,' the panel should nevertheless elicit the position of the parties and/
or pertinent facts and consider the significance of such in its decision."9"
The New York City Collective Bargaining Law requires similar speci-
ficity by the impasse panel, the city's equivalent to an interest arbitration
panel, in its application of the statutory standards.92 To facilitate review
by the Board of Collective Bargaining, the statute further provides that
the party appealing to the Board from the recommendations of an im-
passe panel must specify the recommendations from which it is appealing
and the reasons therefor. 93
82. City of Batavia v. Local 896, Batavia Firefighters Ass'n, 19 PERB 7510, 7520
(Sup. Ct. 1986).
83. See Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Buffalo, 13 PERB 7539 (Sup. Ct.
1980), aff'd and modified. 82 A.D.2d 635, 443 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1981); City of Yonkers v.
Mutual Aid Ass'n of Paid Fire Dep't, Local 628, 80 A.D.2d 597, 436 N.Y.S.2d 1009
(1981); City of Batavia v. Local 896, Batavia Firefighters Ass'n, 19 PERB 7510 (Sup.
Ct. 1986).
84. 82 A.D.2d 635, 443 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1981).
85. Id. at 639, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
86. 80 A.D.2d 597, 436 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (2d Dep't 1981).
87. Id. at 597, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
88. 19 PERB '1 7510 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
89. City of Batavia, 19 PERB at 7520.
90. Id. at 7522.
91. Id. at 7521-22.
92. See generally N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-311 c (1986).
93. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-311c(4) (1986) provides:
(4) Review of impasse panel recommendations: (a) A party who rejects in
whole or in part the recommendation of an impasse panel... may appeal to the
board of collective bargaining for review of the recommendations of the impasse
panel by filing a notice of appeal with said board within ten days of such rejec-
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The limited number of appeals from interest arbitration awards, we
suggest, serves as evidence that carefully drafted statutory standards are
faithfully adhered to by arbitration panels in their determination of the
matters in dispute and that misgivings about delegating legislative au-
thority to "unaccountable" arbitrators94 are largely unfounded.
B. Constitutional Challenges to Interest Arbitration Statutes
The constitutionality of public sector interest arbitration has been
challenged in many of the jurisdictions that have adopted interest arbi-
tration statutes. Constitutional challenges to interest arbitration statutes
generally fall within one of two categories: (1) unlawful delegation of
legislative authority;95 or (2) unlawful intrusion into and divestment of
the local government's autonomy and control which includes claims that
interest arbitration statutes impair the local government's home rule
powers,9 6 interfere with the local government's power to tax,97 and deny
equal protection by violating the one-man, one-vote principle.98
Although most of the challenges have either failed on the merits99 or
been dismissed on procedural grounds,"°° a few have succeeded. 0 '
Interest arbitration statutes have been challenged most often on the
tion.... (b) The notice of appeal shall specify the grounds upon which the
appeal is taken, the alleged errors of the panel, and the modifications requested.
Id
94. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. The one-man, one-vote principle
seeks to ensure that each person has an equal voice in government. See generally L
Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 13-1 to 13-7 (1978).
99. See, e.g., Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass.
769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976); Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412 v. City of
Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v.
School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); City of Amsterdam v.
Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975); Medford Firefighters
Ass'n Local #1431 v. City of Medford, 40 Or. App. 519, 595 P.2d 1268 (1979); Harney
v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Fire-
men's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police
Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976) (en banc); State ex reL Fire Fighters I.ocal
946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
100. See, e.g., Connecticut Ass'n of Educ., Inc. v. Shedd, 197 Conn. 554, 499 A.2d 797
(1985); Town of Berlin v. Santaguida, 181 Conn. 421, 435 A.2d 980 (1980).
101. See, e.g., City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 400 (Me.
1973) (statute failed to provide standards necessary to protect parties from arbitrator's
"possible arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of this delegated power"); Maryland Classi-
fied Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Anderson, 2 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) " 20,414 at
21,384-85 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1976) (because statute failed to include standards to guide arbi-
trators, it constituted an unlawful delegation of power); City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls
Firefighters Local 814, 89 S.D. 455, 460, 234 N.W.2d 35, 37-38 (1975) (court perceived
compulsory arbitration to be unconstitutional interference with municipal functions); Salt
Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1645, 95 LRRM (BNA) 2383,
2385 (Utah 1977) (act failed to provide any protection against arbitrariness nor did it
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ground that they unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to un-
accountable arbitrators. 10 2 Courts generally have rejected this argument
when the interest arbitration statute sets forth criteria to govern the arbi-
tration proceeding and limits the scope of arbitration. 0 3 In those in-
stances, interest arbitration panels are a reasonable method for the
legislature to deal with the wide variety of issues that may arise in a labor
dispute.'" This avenue of attack, however, has met with some success
provide for the accountability necessary for constitutional exercise of political power in a
representative democracy).
In Pennsylvania, after the state's highest court had found a previous arbitration statute
unconstitutional, see Erie Firefighters Local No. 293 v. Gardner, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d
691 (1962) (per curiam), it was necessary to amend the constitution to allow compulsory
arbitration. See Pa. Const. art. III, § 31.
102. Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 815,
821-22 (1984); Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
ment, 79 Yale L. J. 805, 834 (1970).
103. See Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769,
352 N.E.2d 914 (1976); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward,
188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332
N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975); Medford Firefighters Ass'n Local # 1431 v. City
of Medford, 40 Or. App. 519, 595 P.2d 1268 (1979); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255
A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109,
256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553
P.2d 1316 (1976) (en banc); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437
P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). In City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290,
371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975), the leading New York case, the Court of Appeals held that:
there is no constitutional prohibition against the legislative delegation of power,
with reasonable safeguards and standards, to an agency or commission estab-
lished to administer an enactment .... Here, the Legislature has delegated to
PERB [the Public Employment Relations Board], and through PERB to ad hoc
arbitration panels, its constitutional authority to regulate the hours of work,
compensation, and so on, for policemen and firemen in the limited situation
where an impasse occurs. It has also established specific standards which must
be followed by such a panel .... We conclude that the delegation here is both
proper and reasonable.
Id. at 27, 332 N.E.2d at 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 408 (citations omitted).
Also relevant are the comments of Judge Fuchsberg in a concurring opinion:
It is settled law that a delegation of power by the Legislature to a subordinate
body is constitutional, provided it is accompanied by sufficiently specific stan-
dards for its use and provided that the delegation is of power to carry out law,
not power to make law.
In several ... cases, the courts have held that the delegation is of legislative
power but that it is, nevertheless, permissible because the arbitration panel, in
performing a public function, becomes a public body....
I do not find it useful to try to determine with precision whether the particu-
lar delegation of power made here is most accurately classified as legislative,
judicial, or administrative .... [W]hen courts in the past have upheld or invali-
dated delegations of power, they have most frequently done so by first determin-
ing whether the delegation had a rational purpose and adequate safeguards, and
only then have they applied the labels "legislative" or "administrative"-and
we might add "judicial"-to the results of their assessments.
Id. at 34-35, 332 N.E.2d at 297-98, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 414-15 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring)
(emphasis and citations omitted).
104. One judge has explained the rationale succinctly:
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where the statutes were lacking the necessary standards to guide the
arbitrators. 105
Interest arbitration statutes also have been challenged on the ground
that the powers given to interest arbitrators infringe upon the home rule
powers reserved to local governments.' 06 Home rule provisions permit
local governments to adopt charters or ordinances pertaining to issues of
local concern.' 0 7 The courts, however, have held that the local govern-
ment's power to act applies only if its action is not inconsistent with the
state constitution or any general law.' 0 8 Since interest arbitration stat-
utes constitute general laws, the courts have determined that they do not
violate the home rule provision.'°9
Another basis upon which the constitutionality of interest arbitration
statutes has been challenged concerns the power to tax." 0 Opponents of
interest arbitration argue that, since an arbitration panel may issue an
award which raises the cost of municipal services, the enabling statute is
an inappropriate delegation of taxing power."' Courts have rejected this
argument, finding that a tax does not derive from an act merely because
it "may result in the need for... taxation."'"12 Judge Fuchsberg of the
New York Court of Appeals clarified this distinction by observing that,
Disputes between cities and their uniformed services generate an infinity of spe-
cial circumstances and facts. No Legislature could devise a law which would
deal fairly with every issue which could arise in a specific dispute. Instead, the
Legislature has chosen to create a new way to handle such disputes by delegat-
ing powers which may be partly legislative, partly judicial, and partly adminis-
trative; they may even be described as sui generis.
Id at 35, 332 N.E.2d at 298, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
105. See cases cited supra note 101.
106. See, eg., Carofano v. City of Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 629, 495 A.2d 1011,
1014 (1985); Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769,
770-71, 352 N.E.2d 914, 916 (1976); Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412 v.
City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 243, 231 N.W.2d 226, 229, (1975); City of Amsterdam
v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 26, 332 N.E.2d 290, 292, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (1975); City of
Roseburg v. Roseburg Firefighters Local 1489, 292 Or. 266, 268, 639 P.2d 90, 91-92
(1981).
107. See generally I C.D. Sands & M.E. Libonatti, Local Gov't Law §§ 4.01 to 4.15
(1987) (sections authored by D.L. Callies).
108. See, e.g., Carofano, 196 Conn. at 629-31, 495 A.2d at 1014-15; Town of Arlington,
370 Mass. at 773-74, 352 N.E.2d at 918; Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, 394 Mich. at 244-
45, 231 N.W.2d at 229-30; City ofAmsterdan, 37 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 332 N.E.2d at 292-93,
371 N.Y.S.2d at 407-08; City of Roseburg, 292 Or. at 274-78, 639 P.2d at 95-97.
109. See, e.g., Carofano, 196 Conn. at 629-31, 495 A.2d at 1014-15; Town of.Arlington,
370 Mass. at 773-74, 352 N.E.2d at 918-19; Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, 394 Mich. at
243-46, 231 N.W.2d at 229-30; City of Amsterdam, 37 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 332 N.E.2d at
292-93, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 407-08; City of Roseburg, 292 Or. at 274-78, 639 P.2d at 95-97.
110. See, eg., Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394
Mich. 229, 245, 231 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d
19, 27-28, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); City of Spokane v. Spo-
kane Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 461-63, 553 P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (1976).
111. See, e.g., Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, 394 Mich. at 24546, 231 N.W.2d at 230;,
City of Amsterdam, 37 N.Y.2d at 27, 332 N.E.2d at 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 408; City of
Spokane, 87 Wash. 2d at 461, 553 P.2d at 1318.
112. City of Spokane, 87 Wash. 2d at 461, 553 P.2d at 1319; accord Dearborn Fire
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although arbitration awards may impact on the cost of municipal serv-
ices, the municipality remains free to choose the method of meeting these
costs.' 13
This observation accords with the obvious fact that, in the public sec-
tor, neither arbitration awards nor collective bargaining agreements are
self-implementing. If legislative authorization to finance a contract or an
arbitration award does not already exist, the executive must secure fund-
ing from the legislature, reduce services, decline to fill vacancies, or take
other management action to implement the agreement. The important
point remains that the legislature must, either before or after contract
negotiations, determine the appropriate level for government operations
and provide the required funding.
Last, interest arbitration statutes have been challenged on the ground
that arbitrators are not selected in a manner consistent with the one-man,
one-vote principle, 1 4 thereby denying equal protection of the law." 5
The courts consistently have rejected this argument, finding that because
the power of the arbitration panel is administrative, not legislative, the
one-man, one-vote principle does not apply.'1
6
In sum, constitutional challenges to interest arbitration statutes largely
have been unsuccessful. A claim that the statute is an impermissible del-
egation of legislative authority is the only assertion that has met with any
success. Where, however, the statute limits the arbitrator's discretion
and authority, the courts uniformly deem the statute constitutional.
III. EXPERIENCE WITH THE LAW: NEW YORK CITY
Interest arbitration has proven an effective method of avoiding and
resolving employment disputes. The following discussion considers the
operation of interest arbitration in New York City, one jurisdiction in
which it has been successfully utilized.
Two statutes regulate labor disputes between the City of New
York and its employees: the New York State Taylor Law 7 and its local
Fighters Union, 394 Mich. at 245-46, 231 N.W.2d at 230; City of Amsterdam, 37 N.Y.2d
at 41, 332 N.E.2d at 302, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 420 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
113. See City of Amsterdam, 37 N.Y.2d at 41, 332 N.E.2d at 307, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 420
(Fuchsberg, J., concurring); see also Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, 394 Mich. at 245-46,
231 N.W.2d at 230 (arbitration awards may be implemented by an increase in taxes or a
decrease in municipal expenditures); City of Spokane, 87 Wash. 2d at 461, 553 P.2d at
1319 (that an award "may result in the need for local taxation, does not itself impose any
'burden or charge' ").
114. See supra note 98.
115. See, e.g., Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass.
769, 777, 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (1976); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27-
28, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183,
190-91, 255 A.2d 560, 563-64 (1969).
116. See, e.g., Town of Arlington, 370 Mass. at 777-78, 352 N.E.2d at 920-21; accord
City ofAmsterdam, 37 N.Y.2d at 42, 332 N.E.2d at 303, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Fuchsberg,
J., concurring).
117. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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complement, the New York City Collective Bargaining Law
("NYCCBL"). "8 Where local law is silent, or contrary, the Taylor Law
governs." 9 For example, the NYCCBL contains no strike prohibition
per se, but the Taylor Law, which applies to New York City, bans strikes
by public employees. 2'
The NYCCBL is administered by the Board of Collective Bargaining,
a body composed of three neutral members, two labor members, and two
City of New York members.' 2 ' The two labor members and the two city
members choose the chairman of the Board from among the neutral
members.' 2 The Chairman, who must be elected by unanimous vote,
also functions as the director of the Office of Collective Bargaining. 23
The NYCCBL provides procedures, including mediation and the issu-
ance of a final and binding report by an impasse panel for the resolution
of bargaining impasses.124 Impasse panels are endowed with the broad
power to resolve collective bargaining negotiation disputes. 25 Impasse
panel determinations are equivalent to compulsory interest arbitration
awards.1 26 The NYCCBL also specifies certain standards that an im-
118. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 12-301 to 12-316 (1986).
119. See N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 212 (McKinney 1983). The Taylor Law permits local
governments to enact "provisions and procedures" for the regulation of public employees
relations which are "substantially equivalent" to the Taylor Law. Id.
120. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 210(1) (McKinney 1983).
121. N.Y. City Charter Ch. 54, § 1171 (1986) states:
The mayor shall have the power to appoint the city members of the board to
serve at his pleasure, and the labor members of the board from designations by
the municipal labor committee. Each labor and city member shall have an al-
ternate, who shall be appointed and removed in the same manner as the mem-
ber for whom he is the alternate. The chairman and other impartial members
shall be elected by the unanimous vote of the city and labor members, and shall
serve for three year terms....
122. Id at §§ 1170-1171.
123. Id
124. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 12-301 to 12-311 (1986).
125. The NYCCBL grants impasse panels power to:
mediate, hold hearings, compel the attendance of witnesses and the production
of documents, review data, and take whatever action it considers necessary to
resolve the impasse. If an impasse panel is unable to resolve an impasse within
a reasonable period of time, as determined by the director, it shall, within such
period of time as the director prescribes, render a written report containing
findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations for terms of settlement.
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-31 lc(3)(a) (1986). The language of this section indicates that
impasse panels are encouraged to settle bargaining disputes through mediation. Experi-
ence has shown that even if the parties do not reach formal agreement through the
panel's mediatory efforts, and a report and recommendations are issued, very often the
report reflects what the parties informed the panel regarding certain informal agreements
existing between them. See Anderson, The Impact of Public Sector Bargaining: An Essay
Dedicated to Nathan P. Feinsinger, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 986, 1011-15. See also Grodin,
Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 1 Indus. Rel. L.J. 1, 14 (1976) (the
arbitral process as viewed as an extension of the negotiating process).
126. As originally enacted in 1967, the NYCCBL contained provisions for factfinding,
but the recommendations that resulted were only advisory and there was no statutory
finality procedure. See 1967 N.Y. Local Laws 449 (amending N.Y.C.C.B.L. Ch. 54,
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passe panel is to "consider wherever relevant in making its recommenda-
tions for terms of settlement." '127 These standards are similar to those set
forth in the Taylor Law. 2 '
The report of the impasse panel must be published within seven days
of its submission to the parties. 129 The time may be extended, to no more
than thirty days, to permit the parties to conclude a negotiated agree-
§ 1173-7.0(c)). Nonetheless, the City of New York maintained a policy of voluntary
compliance with impasse panel recommendations. In 1969, the Taylor Law was
amended to require the Mayor of the City of New York to submit a plan dealing with the
need for a specified final step in the impasse procedures. 1969 N.Y. Laws Ch. 24, § 11,
79-80.
To develop proposed finality procedures for submission to the state legislature, repre-
sentatives of New York City, the Municipal Labor Committee, and the Office of Collec-
tive Bargaining conducted a series of meetings. Representatives of the mayor's office, the
Municipal Labor Committee, and the City Council rejected proposals to conform New
York City procedures to the Taylor Law as it then stood-that is, to require legislative
action in bargaining impasses. The city council leadership did not wish to play the part
of referee in labor disputes between the Mayor and the public employee unions. The
unions, so long as they were denied the right to strike, preferred a finality method where
the ultimate decision would be made by neutral third parties. See Lindsay, Report Sub-
mitted Pursuant to Chapter 24, Laws of 1969, Designed to Bring New York City's Labor
Relations Practices Into Substantial Equivalence With the Public Employees'Fair Employ-
ment Act 6.
The report also sought a consolidation of jurisdiction over New York City public em-
ployment relations. It suggested giving the Office of Collective Bargaining mandatory
jurisdiction over non-mayoral as well as mayoral agencies. Id. at 3-5. In addition, it
urged a continuation of the policy excluding the city from the Taylor Law requirement
that collective bargaining agreements be concluded prior to budget submission dates. Id.
at 7-8. A discussion of other minor problem areas also was included. Id. at 8-10. A form
of compulsory interest arbitration, therefore, was agreed upon and enacted by the New
York City Council in 1972. 1972 N.Y. Local Laws 158-60 (codified at N.Y.C. Admin.
Code §§ 12-309a (8), 12-311c(3)(e), 12-311c(4), 12-311f (1986)).
127. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-311c(3)(b) (1986) provides:
(b) An impasse panel.., shall consider wherever relevant the following stan-
dards in making its recommendations for terms of settlement:
(i) comparison of the wages, hours, fringe benefits, conditions and
characteristics of employment of the public employees involved in the im-
passe proceeding with the wages, hours, fringe benefits, conditions and
characteristics of employment of other employees performing similar work
and other employees generally in public or private employment in New
York City or comparable communities;
(ii) the overall compensation paid to the employees involved in the im-
passe proceeding, including direct wage compensation, overtime and pre-
mium pay, vacations, holidays and other excused time, insurance,
pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, food and apparel furnished,
and all other benefits received;
(iii) changes in the average consumer prices for goods and services,
commonly known as the cost of living;
(iv) the interest and welfare of the public;
(v) such other factors as are normally and customarily considered in
the determination of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other working con-
ditions in collective bargaining or in impasse panel proceedings.
128. See N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209(4)(c)(V) (McKinney 1983).
129. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-311c(3)(d) (1986).
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ment prior to publication. 3 ° If a contract is negotiated during this time,
the panel will not release the report, except upon consent of the par-
ties. 3 ' If the parties fail to negotiate a contract during this time, they
must indicate acceptance or rejection of the panel recommendations. 132
A party that rejects the recommendations may appeal to the Board of
Collective Bargaining for review. 133
The statute provides strict time limits for filing an appeal of the panel's
report and for issuance of the Board's decision.' 34 The Board normally
decides appeals upon the papers filed by the parties, but it occasionally
will hear oral argument. The Board will issue a decision within thirty
days after the notice of appeal has been filed. 135 The Board bases its
review on the record and evidence before the impasse panel and is guided
by the statutory criteria that the panel must consider.
36
The Board of Collective Bargaining may "affirm or modify the panel
recommendations in whole or in part."'13 7 It may also set aside the rec-
ommendations if it finds that the rights of a party have been
prejudiced. 138 If the Board takes no action within the statutory time pe-
riods, the recommendations are deemed adopted.3 9 The NYCCBL pro-
vides that a final determination of the Board of Collective Bargaining
"shall be binding upon the parties" and "shall constitute an award within
the meaning of article seventy-five of the civil practice law and rules."' 40
The binding effect of a Board determination is qualified by the proviso
that it is subject to legislative action when a law must be amended or
enacted. 141
If both parties accept the panel's recommendations or if neither party
petitions the Board of Collective Bargaining for review, the recommenda-
tions "shall be final and binding."' 42 The recommendations of an im-
passe panel, like the Board's determinations, are subject to legislative
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id at § 12-311c(3)(e).
133. See id. at § 12-311c(4)(a).
134. See id
135. See id. at § 12-31 lc(4)(d). Notice of appeal must be filed and served upon the
other party within ten days after receipt of the impasse panel's recommendations. See id.
at § 12-311 c(4)(a). If there is no final determination by the Board within thirty days of
the filing of the notice of appeal or within forty days of a rejection notice which the board
reviews upon its own initiative, the panel's recommendation is deemed adopted. See id.
at § 12-31 lc(4)(d). The director may extend these periods for an additional period not to
exceed thirty days. See id.
136. See id. at § 12-311c(4)(b).
137. See id at § 12-311c(4)(c).
138. See id.
139. See id at § 12-311c(4)(d).
140. Id at § 12-311c(4)(f).
141. See id at § 12-311c(4)(e).
142. Id. at § 12-31 lc(4)(a). This section also provides that the Board of Collective
Bargaining "may review recommendations which have been rejected" but not appealed.
Id. This action has never been taken.
1987]
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approval, however, in those instances where they require the enactment
of a law. 14
3
The preceding description of finality under the NYCCBL reveals that
the procedure and substance of impasse resolution in New York City
differs in certain respects from the binding finality procedures provided
by the Taylor Law. Although impasse panels have the authority to medi-
ate and are strongly encouraged by the statute to do so,"44 the appoint-
ment of a mediator is not mandatory under the NYCCBL and mediation
is undertaken only when circumstances indicate that it might be produc-
tive.' 45 Under the Taylor Law, interest arbitration awards are directly
appealable to the courts by an article 75 proceeding, 146 whereas, under
the NYCCBL, impasse panel recommendations are appealable first to the
Board of Collective Bargaining. 147 Last, unless the parties stipulate
otherwise, New York City impasse panels are composed of neutrals,1
48
whereas the Taylor Law panels have a tripartite structure. 14
9
When New York City's final and binding impasse procedures were
first introduced, critics claimed that the procedures would encourage the
use of third parties in fashioning contract settlements to the detriment of
concerted efforts at the bargaining table.150 The experience to date, how-
ever, refutes this contention.1 51 In the fifteen years since the adoption of
finality in impasse procedures, only 63 of the 761 reported contract set-
tlements-or 8.3% percent-used the process.' 52 Of these 63 impasse
143. See id. at § 12-311c(3)(e).
144. See id. at § 12-311c(3)(a).
145. See id. at § 12-311b(2).
146. See N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209.4(c)(vii) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. &
R. 7511 (McKinney 1980).
147. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-31 lc(4)(a) (1986).
148. See N.Y.C. Admin Code §§ 12-301 to 12-311 (1986).
149. See N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209.4(c)(ii) (McKinney 1983).
150. Generally, critics of interest arbitration have claimed that its use will have a "chil-
ling" or deterrent effect on the parties' incentive to bargain in good faith. See, e.g.,
McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of
Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1192, 1209-10 (1972).
151. The experience of other states, such as New Jersey, similarly rebut this conten-
tion. The Chairman of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission re-
cently reported on that state's ten year experience with an interest arbitration statute that
combines final offer package arbitration for economic issues and final offer, issue-by-issue
arbitration for non-economic issues. See J. Mastriani, Interest Arbitration in State and
Local Government, Remarks at Arbitration Day Meeting of the American Arbitration
Association (May 7, 1987). First, he reported that strikes and job actions were virtually
non-existent, whereas they had been commonplace prior to the act. Id. at 2-3. He also
reported that the arbitration deadline-the employer's budget submission date-had been
a major stimulus to bargained results aided by mediation. Id. at 4. The Chairman, how-
ever, was more critical of the quality of arbitration awards and called attention to the
need for arbitrators to address the statutory criteria. Id. at 5-6. Lastly, he observed that
arbitration has been a stabilizing and moderating factor in salary determinations. Id. at
6.
152. Finality Report of Office of Collective Bargaining 1972-1986 (available in the files
of the Fordham Law Review)
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cases, the parties accepted the panel's recommendations in 49. ," In the
remaining 14 cases, a party appealed to the Board for final determina-
tion.154 In 12 of those cases, the Board affirmed the report and recom-
mendations of the impasse panel, while the Board acted in the remaining
two cases to reduce the award to conform the recommendations to the
city's fiscal plan.' 55
Another indicator of success of a public sector bargaining law, like
New York's Taylor Law, which provides for arbitration and outlaws the
strike, is whether strikes have occurred. Since the enactment of the New
York City interest arbitration provisions in 1972, only three strikes have
occurred over new contract terms in the course of negotiations of over
750 separate municipal contracts.' 56 In contrast, in the four years prior
to the amendment there were ten strikes in the course of negotiations of
over 517 separate municipal contracts." 7 These figures support the via-
bility of interest arbitration as an effective alternative to the strike.
Comparison of arbitration awards with negotiated settlements also
demonstrates the effectiveness of the process. The New York State Pub-
lic Employment Relations Board 1986-87 Annual Report 58 states that
the arbitrated salary increases statewide for police averaged 6.45%, just
slightly below that of negotiated salary increases which averaged
6.52%.1" For firefighters, the arbitrated awards averaged 5.78%, while
negotiated increases averaged 5.81%."' ° This report indicates that the
negotiated settlements and awards closely parallel each other. 6 ' As
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see infra note 162.
156. In 1973, New York City firefighters went on strike for five and one-half weeks
over the issue of wages. See generally 540 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) B-21 (Feb. 4,
1974); 638 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) B-5 (Jan. 5, 1976). In 1979, employees of the
New York City Off-Track Betting Corporation went on strike for twenty days, again over
the issue of wages. See 913 Gov't Empl. ReL. Rep. (BNA) 33 (May 18, 1981). Last, in
1981, resident physicians in municipal hospitals went on strike for several days over a
demand for guaranteed minimum staff levels for physicians, nurses and technicians. Id.
As a result of the illegal strike the Union was held in contempt and fined S175,000 for
staging the strike. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp. v. Committee of Interns and
Residents of the City of New York, N.Y.L.J. May 8, 1981, at 7, col. I (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County).
157. The source of this data is the Division of Research and Statistics, New York State
Department of Labor (as reported in the 1973 OCB Annual Report at 27) (available in
the files of the Fordham Law Review).
158. 20 PERB News 4 (1987) (Annual Report Edition).
159. Id. at 9. The report also revealed that, out of a universe of 219 contracts, only 39
were submitted to interest arbitration in the period 1986-87, of that number, 21 were
settled by interest arbitration. Id.
160. Id.
161. The report is also consistent with non-PERB studies. Peter Feuille and John T.
Delaney conducted a detailed study of collective bargaining interest arbitration and po-
lice salaries. P. Feuille & J. Delaney, Collective Bargaining, Interest Arbitration and Po-
lice Salaries, 39 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 228 (Jan. 1986). They surveyed 900 cities during
the 1971-81 period and, based upon their survey, concluded that -bargaining and arbitra-
tion's availability have very strong associations with high police salaries, but our results
1987]
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noted previously, during the fifteen-year history of final and binding arbi-
tration in New York City, there have been only two cases where the
Board found awards to be inconsistent with negotiated settlements. 62
On appeal, the tripartite Board of Collective Bargaining, by unanimous
decision, reduced those awards to conform to the city's basic wage
patterns. 
63
CONCLUSION
After nearly two decades of interest arbitration, it is clear that the
also indicate that, in general, arbitration's availability has done relatively little to cause
these high salaries." Id. at 238 (footnote omitted). The authors added that "availability
of arbitration has had a positive but modest impact on police salaries." Id. at 238.
162. See Local No. 3, Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers v. City of New York, No. BCBI-I I-
76, Decision No. B-8-76, slip. op. at 8 (Board of Collective Bargaining Aug. 11, 1976)
(available in the files of the Fordham Law Review); City of New York v. Patrolmen's
Benevolent Ass'n of the District Attorneys' Offices, City of New York, Inc., No. BCBI-
13-77, Decision No. B-3-77, slip. op. at 19-20 (Board of Collective Bargaining Apr. 20,
1977) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review), aff'd sub nom. Higgins v.
Anderson, 97 LRRM 2481 (N.Y.C., Sp. Term. Pt. 1 1977).
163. See Local No. 3, Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers v. City of New York, No. BCBI-I 1-
76, Decision No. B-8-76, slip. op. at 7-8 (Board of Collective Bargaining Aug. 11, 1976)
(available in the files of the Fordham Law Review); City of New York v. Patrolmen's
Benevolent Ass'n of the District Attorneys' Offices, City of New York, Inc., No. BCBI-
13-77, Decision No. B-3-77, slip. op. at 20 (Board of Collective Bargaining Apr. 20, 1977)
(available in the files of the Fordham Law Review), aff'd sub nom. Higgins v. Anderson,
97 LRRM 2481 (N.Y.C., Sp. Term. Pt. 1 1977).
Interest arbitration awards have not been used primarily to determine the basic wage
pattern of the city and its major unions. Of course, wage disputes can go to interest
arbitration and some awards concern attempts to increase the basic wage pattern of the
city because of special conditions of employment. See, e.g., United Fed'n of Teachers,
Local 2 v. Board of Educ., Case No. IA-1-85 at 3-4 (OCB Sept. 16, 1985) (Garrett, Gill
and Scheinman, Arbs.) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review) (award deter-
mined what the minimum and maximum salary rate should be for teachers in the New
York City school system, which was plagued by recruitment and retention problems).
The award of the arbitrators in determining what the proper rate of compensation should
be for two-men sanitation crews assigned to do the work previously performed by three-
men crews is a good example. See City of New York v. Uniformed Sanitationmen's
Ass'n, Local 831, Case No. 1-157-80 (OCB Dec. 10, 1980) (Kelley, Arb.) (available in the
files of the Fordham Law Review). A dispute arose over the city's decision to utilize side
loading collection trucks operated by two-men crews in some sanitation districts instead
of rear loading trucks operated by three-men crews. Id. at 5. The Union argued that
since "the City would save $13,000 per man operating the side loading trucks; that they
'expected a fifty-fifty split.., a differential of $6,500' per annum per man working on the
side loaders." Id. at 9. The Union claimed that the employees "are entitled to their just
due and should be compensated and paid a differential for their extra effort, added re-
sponsibilities and improved productivity." Id. The City, on the other hand, believed no
differential was due. Id. The arbitrator carefully examined the evidence which showed
that "cities operating such equipment have without exception provided a salary differen-
tial to the Driver/Loaders of the side loader when reducing crew size. None, however,
provide a differential of the magnitude proposed by the Union in these proceedings ...."
Id. at 10. Taking into consideration the estimated increases in productivity resulting
from the implementation of the side loaders and the differentials awarded in other juris-
dictions under similar circumstances, the arbitratior awarded a salary differential of $11
per shift per employee. Id.
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practice of interest arbitration is here to stay. It has become a significant
adjunct to the public sector collective bargaining process where the par-
ties reach an impasse in their negotiations. The acceptance of the consti-
tutionality of interest arbitration by the courts and the acceptance of the
process by the parties demonstrates that this important means of dispute
settlement has been developed in accordance with our democratic
principles.
The task of interest arbitration is analogous to that of legislation-to
establish the conditions of employment. Each party must try to persuade
the arbitrator why a particular position is, or is not, supported by the
evidence produced under the governing statutory standards. Because the
task is to legislate the terms of employment, not to prove or disprove a
particular set of facts, an interest arbitration should not be presented to
an arbitrator as a trial lawyer would present a civil case to a judge or
jury.
Interest arbitration enables the labor participants to retain the leverage
necessary to bargain effectively in negotiating a contract. At the same
time, the harmful effects of a strike are avoided. Experience shows that
the ends achieved with interest arbitration are analogous to those
achieved in jurisdictions that do not prohibit the strike. In short, the
experiences during the past two decades of the various jurisdictions that
have adopted interest arbitration demonstrate that interest arbitration is
a better way to surmount collective baragaining impasses than the trial
by combat method of the strike.
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